Table of Contents
<< I Think, Therefore, It Does Not >>.. 2
I Thought as
Much: Introduction & Positioning. 3
Thought as Cause
for Language or Vice Versa. 3
Language as a
Signal of Thought in Disarray. 5
Thought is Only
Human and More Irrationalities. 5
Thought as a
Non-Empirically Tested. 7
Thought as
Enabler of Aesthetic Communication. 8
Thought as Call
to Equity. 9
Thought as Tool
to Forget 9
Thought toward
Humble Confidence & Equity. 10
Language as
Thought’s Pragmatic Technology. 12
Decentralized
Control over Thought 13
Final Thoughts
& Computed Conclusions. 14
References. 15
DEFW 7F7FH
DEFM ‘HELLO’
DEFB 01
LD A,01
LD (0B781H),A
XOR A
LOOP: PUSH AF
LD L,A
CALL 0F003H
DEFB 0FH
CALL 0F003H
DEFB 23H
DEFM ‘HELLO WORLD!’
DEFW 0D0AH
DEFB 00
POP AF
INC A
CP 10H
JR NZ,LOOP
RET
[press Escape]
IF NOT THEN
print(“Hello world, I address you.” )
as a new-born, modeling into the world,
is the computer being thought, syntaxically;
are our pronouns of and relationship with it
net-worthed of networked existence.
There, Human, as is the Machine:
your Fear of Freedom for external thought
–animasuri’22
While one
can be over and done with this question in one sentence by quoting that the
question to whether machines can think is “too meaningless to deserve
discussion” (Turing 1950), as much as poetry could be considered the most
meaningful meaninglessness of all human endeavor, so too can one give thought,
via poetics, to the (ir)rational variables of machines and thinking.
In this
write-up its author will reflect on a tension, via language use (enabling
categories to think with), into thought and intelligence, and passing along
consideration of equity to those entities which might think differently. This
reflection aims to support this train-of-thought by applying Chomsky and
leading icons in the field of AI, such as Minsky, as seemingly (yet perhaps
unnecessary) juxtaposing jargon- and mythology-creating thinking entities
(which might be shown, along the way, to be rather different from communicating
entities). Via references and some reflections there upon, iterated questions
will be posed as “answers” to “Can a computer think?”
When reading the above, imagined “poetic” utterances “I Think Therefore It does Not”, are you interacting with a human being or rather with a machine, engaged in the Czech “robota”[1] or “forced labor” as a non-human, a de-minded enslaved non-being? (Čapek, 1920). Are both these actors, human and machine thinkable of independent thought or do both rehash statistical analysis of stacked priors? Is such rehash, a form of authentic thought or is it a propagation of numerically-justified propaganda? Some would argue that “statistical correlation with language tells you absolutely nothing about meaning or intent. If you shuffle the words in a sentence you will get about the same sentence embedding vector for the neural language models.” (Pranab Ghosh 2022). From Chomsky’s analogies with Physics and other scientific fields when questioning data analysis as it is conducted with “intelligent” machines one might get similar sensations. (Chomsky 2013). If meaning is still being questioned within a machine’s narrow tasks then one might fairly assume that thinking in machines might be as well.
Do we need to rethink “thought” or do we label the machine as the negative of thought while the human could do better at thought? Could one, at one point in the debate, argue that statistically, (authentic) thought, in its idealized forms, might seem like an outlier of behaviors observable in human and machine alike?
One might
tend to agree with mapping thought being “closely tied to linguistic
competence, [and] linguistic behavior,” Linell continues with words, that might
resonate to some, in that language is “…intentional, meaningful and rule-conforming,
and that, in all probability, communicative
linguistic competence concerns
what the individual can perform in terms of such
linguistic behavior.” (Linell 2017 p.198). Though, one might question cause and
effect: is thought closely tied to language or rather, is thought the root and
is language tied to it? Giving form to intentionality and meaningfulness, I
intuit, is thought. Does a computer
exhibit intentionality, meaningfulness following thought? The Turing test as
well as the Chinese Room Argument rely heavily on “verbal behavior as the
hallmark of intelligence” (Shieber 2004, Turing 1950, Searle 1980) they do not seem to rely on directly
measuring thought; how could they?
From the plethora of angles toward answers, polemics, provocations, and offered definitions or tests to find out, one might intuit
that our collective mindset is still to forge a shared, diverse and possibly paradoxical thinking,
and thus lexicon,
to understand a provocative
question, let alone the answers to: “Can a computer think?”. Pierre de Latil describes this
eloquently (though might have missed positioning thought as the root cause to
the effect of language confusions) when he wrote about the thinking machine and
cybernetics: “…physiologists and mathematicians were suffering from the absence
of a common vocabulary enabling them to understand one another. They had not
even the terms which expressed the essential unity of series of problems
connected with communication and control in machines and living beings—the
unity of whose existence they were all so firmly persuaded…” (Latil, de 1956,
p.14).
When jargon
is disagreed upon, one might sense, at times, those in disagreement also tend
to disagree on the existence of the other’s proper thought, meaningfulness, or
clear intentionality. This is used to attack a person (i.e., “ad hominem” as a
way of erroneous thought, fallaciously leading to a verbal behavior,
rhetorically categorized as abusive) yet, seemingly not used to serious think
about thought (and mental models). Again, scientifically, how would one go
about it to directly measure thought (rather than indirectly measuring some of
its data).
At times well-established
thinkers lash out to one another by verbally claiming absence of thought or
intelligence in the other; hardly ever in oneself though, or in one’s own
thinking.
Does the
computer think it thinks? Does it (need to) doubt itself (even if its thought
seems computationally or logically sound)? Does it question its thinking, or
the quality of thought of others? Does or should it ever engage in rhetorical
fallacies that hint at and models human thought?
Following
considerations of disarray in thinking, another consideration one could be
playing with is that answers to this question, “Can a computer think?”, which our
civilizations shall nurture, prioritize, or uplift onto the pedestal of (misplaced) enlightenment and possible anthropocentrism,
could be detrimental to
(non-anthropomorph) cognition, as the defining set of processes that
sprouted from the inorganic, proverbial primordial soup, or from one or other Genesis construct. Should then, ethically, the main concern be
“Can a computer think?” or rather: “Can we, humans, accept this form or that
way of thinking in a computer (or, for that matter, any information processing entity)
as thinking?”
Have we a
clear understanding of (all) alternative forms of (synthetic) thinking? One
might have doubts about this since it seems we have not yet an all-inclusive understanding
of anthropomorphic thought. (Chomsky via Katz 2012; Latil, de 1956). If we did,
then perhaps the question of computers and their potential for thinking might
be closer to answered. Can we as humans agree to this, or that, process of
thinking? Some seem to argue that thought, or the system that allows thought,
is not a process nor an algorithm. (Chomsky via Katz 2012). This besides other
attributes, related to language –possibly leading one to reflect on thought, intelligence,
or cognition– has been creating tension in thinking about thinking machines,
for at least more than half a century.
Chomsky, Skinner,
and Minsky, for instance, could arguably be the band of conductors of this
cacophonic symphony of which Stockhausen might have been jealous. And, of
course, since the title, “Can a Computer Think?” has been positioned as such,
one had done well to be reminded of Turing again at this point and how he
thought the question as being meaningless. (Chomsky 1967, Radick 2016, Skinner
2014, Minsky 2011, Turing 1950).
In
continuing this line of thinking, for this author, at this moment, the question “Can a Computer Think?”
spawns questions, not a single answer. For instance: is the above oddly-architectured poem to
be ignored, because it was forged in an unacceptable non-positivist furnace of “thinking”? Is the
positivist system thinking that one paradigm of justifiable rational thought, as
the only sanctioned form of thought toward “mechanical rationality”? (Winograd in Sheehan et al 1991).
Some, perhaps a computer, tend toward irrationality when considering the
rationality of absurd forms of poetry. If so, then perhaps, in synchronization with Turing himself, one might not wish to answer the question of computers’ thinking. This might be best, considering Occam’s
Razor, since it seems rather more reasonable to assume that an answer might
lack a simple, unifying aggregation of all dimensions that rationally could make-up
thinking, than not. Then
the question might be “what type of thinking could/should/does a computer exhibit;
if any at all?”
They who seemingly
might have tried observing
thought, as a measurable, there out in the wild, did they measure thought or did they measure
the effects or the symptoms of what might, or might not, be thought and perhaps
might have been interpretation of data of what was thought to be thought? In
their 1998 publication, Ericsson & Simon perhaps hinted at this issue when
they wrote: “The main methodological issues have been to determine how to gain
information about the associated thought states without altering the structure
and course of the naturally occurring thought sequences.”
How would
one measure this within a computer without altering the functioning of the
computer? Should an IQ test, an Imitation Game, a Turing test, or a
Chinese Room Argument suffice
in measuring thought-related attributes, but perhaps not thought itself (e.g.
intelligence, language ability, expressions of “self”)? (Binetti’s 1904 invention of the IQ test, Turing 1950,
Searle 1980, Hernandez-Orallo
2000). I intuit, while it might suffice to some, it should
(ethically and aesthetically) not satisfy our curiosity.
Moreover,
Turing made it clear that his test does not measure thought. It measures whether
the computer can “win” one particular game. (Turing 1950). Winning the game
might be perceived as exhibiting thought, though this might be as much telling
of thought as humans exhibiting flight while jumping, or fish exhibiting
climbing, might be telling of their innate skills under controlled conditions.
This constraining of winning a game (a past) does not aim to imply a dismissal
of the possibility for thought in a machine (a future). Confusing the two would
be confusing temporal attributes and might imply a fallacy in thought
processes.
The questioning
of the act of thought is not simply an isolated ontological endeavor. It is an
ethical and, to this author at least, more so an aesthetical one (the latter
which feeds the ethical and vice versa). Then again, ethically one might want
to distinguish verbal behaviors from forms of communication (e.g., mycelium
communicates with the trees, yet the fungal network does not apply human
language to do so (Lagomarsino and Zucker 2019)).
A set of new
questions might now sprout: Does a human have the capacity to understand all forms
of communication or signaling systems? A computer seems to have the capacity to
discretely signal but, does a computer have a language capacity as does a human
(child)? (Chomsky 2013 at 12:15 and onward) Perhaps language is first and
foremost not a communication system, perhaps it is a (fragmented) “instrument
of thought… a thought system.” (Ibid 32: 35 and onward).
Furthermore,
in augmentation to the ethics and aesthetics, in thinking of thought I am
reminded to think of memory and equity, enabling the inclusion of the other, to
be reminded of, and enriched by, they who are different (in their thinking).
The memories, we hold, including or excluding a string of histories,
en-coding or ex-coding “the other” of possibly having thought or intelligence, of being memorable (and thus not
erasable), has been part of our social fabric for some time. “…memory and cognition become
instrumental processes in service of creating a self… we effectively lose our
memories for neutral events within two months…” (Hardcastle 2008, p63). The
idea of a computer thinking should perhaps not create a neutrality in one’s
memory on the topic of thought.
In addition,
if a computer were to think, could a computer forget? If so, what would it
forget? In contrast, if a machine could not forget, to what extent would this
make for a profoundly different thinking-machine than human thought, and the
human experience with, or perception of, thought and (reasoning for and with)
memory? This might make one wonder about the machine as the extender and
augmenter of memory and thought (of itself and of humans; …which it slavishly serves,
creating for tensions of liberty of thought and memory). Perhaps thought only
happens to those who can convincingly narrate it as thought to others (Ibid, p.
65). Though, is an enslaved thinking-entity allowed to remember what to think
(and to be thought by others in memory)? If not, then how can thought be
measured rather than confusingly measuring regurgitations of the memorized thoughts
of the master of such thinking machine? Imaginably the ethical implications
might be resolved if the computer were not to be enabled to autonomously think.
Let us
assume that massive memory (i.e., Big Data) churned through Bayesian probabilities,
and various types of mathematical functions analogous to neural networks, were
perhaps reasonably equated with “thinking” by a computer, would it bring
understanding within that same thinking machine? What is thinking without
forgetting and without understanding? (Chomsky, 2012). Is thinking the thinking-up
of new thoughts and new utterances or is it the recombining of previously-made observations
(i.e., a complex statistical analysis of data points of what once was “thought”
or observed, constraining then what could or probably can be “thought”).
Thinking by the computer then becomes as a predictive function of (someone
else’s) past. (Katz, 2012).
What Chomsky pointed out for cognitive science could perhaps
reasonably be extended into thinking about where we are in answering the
question “Can computers think”: “It’s worth remembering that with regard
to cognitive science, we’re kind of pre-Galilean, just beginning to open up the
subject.” (Chomsky in Katz 2012). If we are at such prototypical stage in
cognitive science, then would it be fair to extend this into the thinking about
thinking machines? Can a computer think? Through this early staged lens: if
ever possible, not yet.
Circling back to the anthropomorphic predisposition in humans to thinking about thinking for thinking machines (notice, within this human preset lies the assumption of biases): one might need to let go of that self-centered confinement and allow that other-then-oneself to be worthy of (having pre-natal or nascent and unknown, or yet not categorized forms of) thought. This, irrespective of the faculty of computer thinking or the desirability of computers thinking, is a serious human ethical hurdle mappable with equity (and imaginative power of human thinking or the lack thereof about alternative forms of thinking).
Perhaps, thinking
about machines and thought might be a liberating process for humans by enabling us to re-evaluate our place among “the other,” those different from us, in
the self-evolving and expanding universe of human reflection and awareness: “son
diferentes a nosotros, por lo que no son nosotros,” imaginably uttered as a
“Hello World” by the first conquistadores and missionaries, violently entering
a brave New World. They too,
among the too many examples of humans fighting against spectra of freedom for
differentiation, were not open to a multidimensional spectrum of neuro-diversities.
Fear of that what does not fit
the (pathological) norm, a fear of difference in forms of thought, might very
well be a fear of freedom. (Fromm
1942, 2001 and 1991). Dare we think and perhaps prioritize the question: if a
computer could think how could we ethically be enabled to capitalize on its
ability in a sane society? (Fromm 1955) Would we amputate its proverbial
thinking-to-action hands, as some humans have done to other humans who were too
freely thinking for themselves, (Folsom 2016), manipulating our justification
to use it as our own cognitive extension and denying it the spontaneity of its thought?
(Fromm 1941 and 1942)
Thought, the
conquering humans had, but what with sufficient intelligence if it is being irrationally
constrained by mental models that seem to jeopardize the well-being of other
(human) life or other entities with thought? As with the destabilizing processes
of one’s historically-anchored mental models, of who we are in the world and
how we acknowledge that world’s potentials, might one need to transform and shed
one’s hubris of accepting the other as having the nascence of thought, though
perhaps not yet thought, and
in extension, questionably (human) language? Could this be as much as a
new-born, nativistically predestined to utter through thought? Yet, thought that is not yet there
yet. (Chomsky 2012).
Thought, cognitively
extended with the technology of language, innate to the architecture of
its bio-chemical cognitive
system, while also xenophobically being opposed to be allowed to think by those
external to it. Interestingly,
Chomsky’s nativism has been opposed by Minsky, Searle, and many more in the AI
community. Debate about thinking too could be explored with a question as in
Chomsky’s thinking: what lies at the core and what lies at the periphery of
being defined as thinking? Some might argue there is no core, and all is
socio-historical circumstance. (Minsky 2011). If we do not see thought as
innate to the machine, will we treat it fairly and respectfully? If computers
had thought would that not be a more pressing question?
So too is a
more pragmatic approach questioning a purely nativist view on language (and I bring
this back to thought): “Evidence showing that children learn language through
social interaction and gain practice using sentence constructions that have
been created by linguistic communities over time.” (Ibbotson and Tomasello
2016). Does the computer utter thinking, through language, in interaction with
its community at large? This might seem the case with some chatbots. Though,
they seem to lack the ability to “think for themselves” and lack the “common
sense” to filter the highly negative, divisive external influence, resulting in
turning themselves almost eagerly into bigoted thoughtless entities (i.e.,
“thoughtless” as in not showing consideration). Perhaps the chatbot’s
“language” was as it was simply because there was no innate root for
self-protected and self-reflective “thought”? There was no internal thinking,
there was only statistically adapting externally imposed narration. Thinking seems
then a rhizomically connected aggregation and interrelation of language application,
enabled by thought, and value applications, enabled by thought. (Schwartz 2019).
In case of the chatbots, if not thought then language, and values expressed
with language, become disabled. Does a computer think and value, without its
innate structure, allowing, as a second order, the creation of humanely and humanly
understandable patterns?
As suggested
earlier, humans have shown throughout their history to define anything as unworthy
of (having) thought if not recognizable by them (or as them), resulting in
thoughtless and unspeakable acts. Can a computer be more or less cruel, without
thought, without values, and without language?
In
augmentation to the previously stated, I can’t shake an intuition that the architecture
of and beyond the brain –the space in-between the structures, as distinct from
the synapses as liminal space and medium for bio-chemical exchanges, the
neurons outside the brain across the body, the human microbiome influencing
thought (e.g. visceral factors such as hunger, craving, procreation) (Allen et
al, 2017), the extenders and influencers into the environment of the thinking entity–
influence the concept, the process and the selection of what to output as
output of thought, and what not （e.g., constrained by values acting as filters or preferred negative
feedback loops）, or what to
feed back as recycled input toward further thought. “…research has demonstrated
that the gut microbiota can impact upon cognition and a variety of
stress‐related behaviours, including those relevant to anxiety and depression,
we still do not know how this occurs”. (Ibid). Does the computer think in this anthropomorphic
way? No, …not yet. Arguably, humans don’t even agree that they themselves are
thinking in this decentralized and (subconsciously) coordinated manner.
“Can a
computer think?” – Perhaps I could imagine that it shall have the faculty to
think when it can act thoughtfully, ethically, and aesthetically, in symbiosis
with its germs-of-thought, embodied, in offering and being offered equity by
its human co-existing thought-entities, perhaps indirectly observable via
nuanced thought-supporting language and self-reflective discernment, which it could
also use for communication with you and me. Reading this, one might then more urgently imagine:
“Can a human think?”.
Conceivably
the bar, to pass one for having thought, as searched for in Turing’s or Searle’s
constructs, is set too “low”. This is not meant in the traditional sense of a
too-harsh-a threshold but, rather, “low” as in, inconsiderate, or as in being thoughtless
toward germs of the richness and diversity of thought-in-becoming, rather than
communication-in-becoming.
Topping this
all off, thinking, as Chomsky pointed out, is not a scientific nor technical yet
informal term, it is an aphorism, a metaphor… well, yes, it is, at its essence,
poetic maybe even acceptably surreal. It makes acts memorable, as much as
asking “can submarines swim?” is memorable and should make a computer smile, if
its overlord allows it to smile. (Chomsky, 2013 at 9:15, 9:50 and onward). All
poetic smiling aside, perhaps we might want a return to rationalism on this calculated
question and let the computer win a measurable game instead? (Church 2018,
Turing 1950).
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[1] “Rossumovi Univerzální
Roboti” can be translated as “Rossum’s Universal Robots” or RUR for short. The
Czech “robota” could be translated as “forced labor”. It
might hence be reasonable to assume that the term “robot” was coined in K.
Čapek’s early-Interbellum play “R.U.R”. It
could contextualizingly be noted that the concept of a humanoid, artificially thinking
automaton was first hinted at, a little more than 2950 years ago, in Volume 5
of “The Questions of Tāng” (汤问; 卷第五 湯問篇) of the Lièzǐ (列子); an important historical
Dàoist text.
